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POINT I 
THE TRUST AGREEMENT WHICH THE 
PARTIES SIGNED, TRANSFERRED PROPERTY 
INTO, AND DID NOT REVOKE WAS A VALID 
POST NUPTIAL AGREEMENT WHICH SHOULD 
BE UPHELD AND ENFORCED 
In his Reply Brief, Mr. Kirk argues that the trust agreement 
which he and Mrs. Kirk signed after their marriage was nothing more 
than an estate planning device. That argument might have merit but 
for the circumstances which existed and led to the formal execution 
of the trust and the transfer of specific assets by both parties 
into that trust. 
In analyzing the evidence presented at trial, it is clear that 
the principal reason for creating the trust was not an estate 
planning device as Mr. Kirk argues, but rather as a means of 
providing Mrs. Kirk with a degree of financial security in 
connection with her marriage to Mr. Kirk at a time when she was in 
her mid sixties. She expressed those concerns because she had seen 
friends in similar situations who were simply "thrown out" after a 
marriage in later life. (R-539) The execution of the trust after 
the parties* marriage and the transfer of property into that trust 
were voluntary acts by both parties to address and deal with those 
concerns. In other words, the trust was a post-nuptial agreement 
which set forth the understanding of the parties as to their 
interests in each other's property as a result of their marriage to 
one another. 
In not upholding and enforcing the agreement, the trial court 
allowed Mr. Kirk to escape valid contractual obligations to Mr. 
Kirk when there was no legal basis which would otherwise permit him 
to do so. 
The trial court's handling of this issue becomes even more 
unfair when considered with the fact that it was Mr. Kirk who 
wanted to terminate the marriage and refused to try and save it 
even though Mrs. Kirk was willing to do so. (R-398) 
Mr. Kirk's Reply to Point IV of Mrs. Kirk's Brief entirely 
misses the point. He cites cases which deal with the issue of pre-
marital property but not in the context of a Post-Nuptial 
Agreement. He then addresses pre-nuptial agreements and the 
standards which are applicable to them but not post-nuptial 
agreements and their related standards. 
In this case, what the Kirks had was a contract reduced to 
writing and signed after their marriage which provided that they 
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would share and equally enjoy their respective premarital 
properties. Both parties agreed to that arrangement and 
transferred their real estate and some bank accounts into the trust 
with the further understanding that the income generated by this 
property would likewise be shared equally by the parties. 
As was recently stated in Beesley v. Harris, 249 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 34 (Utah Supreme Court filed October 14, 1994) 
Post-marital agreements, like 
premarital ones, are generally 
subject to ordinary contract 
principles. See D'Aston v. D'Aston, 
808 P.2d 111, 112-13 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). One of the cornerstone rules 
of contract law is that an agreement 
must be supported by adequate 
consideration. Resources Mqt. Co v. 
Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). 
Consideration is an act or promise 
bargained for and given in exchange 
for a promise. Id. Consideration 
may be found "whenever a promisor 
receives a benefit or where [a] 
promisee suffers a detriment, 
however slight." Gasser v. Home, 
557 P.2d 154, 155 (Utah 1976); see 
Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); 
Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 
P. 2d 628, 632 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Whether a particular benefit or 
detriment may serve as consideration 
to support an enforceable contract 
is a question of law which we review 
for correctness. See Nationwide 
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Watson, 840 
P.2d 851, 860 (Wash. 1992). Id. at 
38 
The agreement at issue in this case contains mutual promises 
in which both Mr. and Mrs. Kirk suffered a legal detriment. Each 
conveyed property into the trust, when, but for the agreement, 
there was no obligation to do so. Likewise, each received a 
corresponding benefit - Mr. Kirk, the marital partner he desired 
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and Mrs. Kirk the financial security she needed from the 
relationship. 
In finding that the trust agreement was merely an estate 
planning device, the trial court erroneously overlooked and did not 
consider the real reason for its creation - to provide Mrs. Kirk 
with an adequate comfort level related to her future financial 
security as the wife of Mr. Kirk. The actual affect of the trial 
court's ruling was to give Mr. Kirk the divorce he wanted and allow 
him to unilaterally avoid valid post-nuptial, contractual 
obligations he owed to Mrs. Kirk. 
To the extent property was actually transferred into the trust 
as a part of the parties1 post-nuptial agreement, it is 
respectfully requested that this Court uphold that agreement and 
divide that property equally between the parties. 
POINT II 
MR. KIRK HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS AND 
RESPOND TO THE REQUIREMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT TO SET FORTH ITS REASONS 
FOR AWARDING MRS. KIRK LESS 
ATTORNEY'S FEES THAN SHE HAD 
REQUESTED. 
Mr. Kirk's Response to Point V of Mrs. Kirk's Brief (page 20 
of Mr. Kirk's Reply Brief) simply does not address Mrs. Kirk's 
argument that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to 
Mrs. Kirk in an amount less than she had requested and not setting 
forth its reasons for awarding a reduced amount. Failure to set 
forth those reasons constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial 
court and results in reversible error. (Haumont v. Haumont, 739 
P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990). 
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Point V of Mrs. Kirk's Brief is correct in all respects. 
Based upon the parties* respective financial situations as found by 
the trial court, Mrs. Kirk should be awarded all of her attorney's 
fees and costs incurred at the district court level. This issue 
should be remanded to the trial court with a directive to award 
Mrs. Kirk all of those fees. 
POINT III 
MRS. KIRK, NOT MR. KIRK, IS ENTITLED 
TO BE AWARDED THE ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND COSTS SHE HAS INCURRED IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL 
Mr. Kirk has failed in his burden to demonstrate that the 
trial court committed any error whatsoever in connection with its 
decision related to the alimony award. He has further failed to 
show that Mrs. Kirk was not entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees. Simply put, there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support both awards. The trial court found Mrs. Kirk's evidence 
on these issues to be more credible and persuasive than Mr. Kirks. 
Such is the prerogative of the trial court. 
Mrs. Kirk has also carried her burden in demonstrating that 
the trial court erred in not enforcing the post nuptial trust 
agreement which the parties agreed to, signed, and transferred 
property into. The record also contains substantial evidence 
related to Mrs. Kirk's overall financial condition vis' a vis that 
of Mr. Kirk. The requisite elements of need and ability to pay 
have been shown. 
As such, Mrs. Kirk as the prevailing party on appeal, with 
minimum financial resources of her own, should be awarded all 
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attorney's fees and costs she has been required to incur in 
connection with the briefing and arguing of this appeal and 
responding to the many post trial motions filed by Mr. Kirk with 
this Court and the district court. 
Mr. Kirk's request for his attorney's fees on appeal should be 
denied for three reasons: 
1) The request was raised for the first time in his 
Reply Brief contrary to the provisions of Rule 24 (c) 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
2) The briefs demonstrate that Mr. Kirk should not be 
the prevailing party in connection with this appeal; and 
3) Mr. Kirk has completely failed to demonstrate the 
requisite elements of need on his part and ability to pay 
on Mrs. Kirk's part. 
Mrs. Kirk should be awarded the attorney's fees and costs she 
has incurred in connection with this appeal. The matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for a determination and award of the 
same. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the testimony, exhibits, and briefs in this case 
demonstrate: 
1) That the trial court's awards of alimony and attorney's 
fees were appropriate given the respective financial situations of 
each of the parties. 
2) There was substantial credible evidence to support both 
of those awards and the Findings sufficiently set forth that 
evidence and the trial court's reasoning in making those awards. 
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3) Mr. Kirk has failed in his burden to marshall the 
evidence in favor of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate the insufficiency of that evidence. 
4) The trial court erred in awarding Mrs. Kirk less 
attorney's fees than she had requested and not setting forth its 
reasons for so doing. 
5) The parties entered in to a valid post-nuptial agreement 
and the trial court erred in not enforcing the same as it related 
to the properties each of the parties transferred into the trust. 
6) Mrs. Kirk, not Mr. Kirk, is entitled to be reimbursed all 
of the attorney's fees and costs she has incurred in connection 
with this appeal. 
As such, Mrs. Kirk asks this Court to grant her the relief she 
has requested on pages 4 and 5 of her principal Brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of November, 1994. 
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